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In the 25 years since becoming commercially available, the Internet has grown into a global communication
infrastructure connecting a significant part of mankind and become an important part of modern society. Its impressive
growth has been fostered by innovative applications, many of which were completely unforeseen by the Internet’s
inventors. While fully acknowledging ingenuity and creativity of application designers, it is equally impressive how
little the core architecture of the Internet has evolved during this time. However, the ever evolving applications and
growing importance of the Internet have resulted in increasing discordance between the Internet’s current use and its
original design. In this thesis, we focus on four sources of discomfort caused by this divergence.
First, the Internet was developed around host-to-host applications, such as telnet and ftp, but the vast majority of its
current usage is service access and data retrieval. Second, while the freedom to connect from any host to any other host
was a major factor behind the success of the Internet, it provides little protection for connected hosts today. As a result,
distributed denial of service attacks against Internet services have become a common nuisance, and are difficult to
resolve within the current architecture. Third, Internet connectivity is becoming nearly ubiquitous and reaches
increasingly often mobile devices. Moreover, connectivity is expected to extend its reach to even most extreme places.
Hence, applications’ view to network has changed radically; it’s commonplace that they are offered intermittent
connectivity at best and required to be smart enough to use heterogeneous network technologies. Finally, modern
networks deploy so-called middleboxes both to improve performance and provide protection.
In this thesis, we design a clean-slate network architecture that is a better fit with the current use of the Internet. We
present a name resolution system based on name-based routing. It matches with the service access and data retrieval
oriented usage of the Internet, and takes the network imposed middleboxes properly into account. We then propose
modest addressing-related changes to the network layer as a remedy for the denial of service attacks. Finally, we take
steps towards a data-oriented communications API that provides better decoupling for applications from the network
stack than the original Sockets API does. The improved decoupling both simplifies applications and allows them to be
unaffected by evolving network technologies: in this architecture, coping with intermittent connectivity and
heterogenous network technologies is a burden of the network stack.
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Viimeisen kahdenkymmenenviiden vuoden aikana Internet on kasvanut globaaliksi tietoverkoksi, joka yhdistää ihmisiä
ja josta on tullut tärkeä osa modernia yhteiskuntaa. Internetin kasvun taustalla on monia innovatiivisia sovelluksia,
jotka ovat muuttaneet ihmisten arkipäivää merkittävästi. Internetin kasvu on ollut vaikuttavaa, mutta yhtä vaikuttavaa
on se, miten vähän sen tekninen perusta on muuttunut samana aikana. Internetin kasvaminen ja sovellusten
kehittyminen vievät Internetiä yhä kauemmas tehtävästä, johon se alunperin suunniteltiin. Tämä aiheuttaa yhä
enemmän teknisiä ristiriitoja.
Työssä keskitytään neljän ongelman ratkaisemiseen:
1.) Internet kehitettiin puhtaasti tietokoneiden väliseen liikenteeseen, mutta nykyisin valtaosa Internetin käytöstä on
tiedon latausta ja palveluiden käyttöä. Tarvittavat tekniset ratkaisut ovat monimutkaisia. 2.) Internet perustuu
avoimuuteen ja mikä tahansa verkkoon liitetty tietokone voi muodostaa yhteyden mihin tahansa toiseen
tietokoneeseen. Tämä periaate johtaa tietoturvaongelmiin ja hajautetuista palvelunestohyökkäyksistä on tullut vaikea
pulma Internet-palveluille. 3.) Internet-yhteyksien määrä on kasvanut ja verkkoon on kytketty yhä useampia
monipuolisin yhteystekniikoin varustettuja mobiililaitteita. Samalla tietoverkkojen oletetaan ulottuvan kaikkialle.
Tämän vuoksi sovellusten on oltava verkkoa käyttäessään yhä älykkäämpiä. 4.) Verkkoon liitettyjen tietokoneiden
suojaamiseksi sekä sovellusten tehostamiseksi verkkoihin asennetaan niin sanottuja middleboxeja. Näiden laitteiden
toiminta kuitenkin perustuu Internetin suunnitteluperiaatteiden vastaisiin tekniikoihin, jotka monimutkaistavat
verkkoja ja sovellusprotokollia.
Väitöskirjassa suunnitellaan uusi verkkoarkkitehtuuri, joka vastaa paremmin Internetin muuttuneita käyttötarpeita. Työ
koostuu kolmesta osa-alueesta. Ensimmäisessä osassa laaditaan reititykseen pohjautuva nimipalvelu, jonka ansiosta
tiedon latauksesta, palveluiden käytöstä ja middleboxien asentamisesta tulee verkolle luontevaa. Toisessa osassa
suunnitellaan verkkokerrokselle osoitteistusmuutoksia, joiden avulla palvelunestohyökkäykset voidaan torjua.
Kolmannessa osassa esitellään uusi sovellusrajapinta, joka yksinkertaistaa sovelluksia ja mahdollistaa niiden
käyttämisen yhä kehittyvien verkkoteknologioiden kanssa.

Abstract
In the 25 years since becoming commercially available, the Internet has grown into a
global communication infrastructure connecting a signicant part of mankind and has
become an important part of modern society. Its impressive growth has been fostered
by innovative applications, many of which were completely unforeseen by the Internet’s
inventors. While fully acknowledging ingenuity and creativity of application designers, it
is equally impressive how little the core architecture of the Internet has evolved during
this time. However, the ever evolving applications and growing importance of the Internet
have resulted in increasing discordance between the Internet’s current use and its original
design. In this thesis, we focus on four sources of discomfort caused by this divergence.
First, the Internet was developed around host-to-host applications, such as telnet and
p, but the vast majority of its current usage is service access and data retrieval. Second,
while the freedom to connect from any host to any other host was a major factor behind
the success of the Internet, it provides little protection for connected hosts today. As
a result, distributed denial of service attacks against Internet services have become a
common nuisance, and are dicult to resolve within the current architecture. ird,
Internet connectivity is becoming nearly ubiquitous and reaches increasingly oenmobile
devices. Moreover, connectivity is expected to extend its reach to even most extreme
places. Hence, applications’ view to network has changed radically; it’s commonplace
that they are oered intermittent connectivity at best and required to be smart enough
to use heterogeneous network technologies. Finally, modern networks deploy so-called
middleboxes both to improve performance and provide protection. However, when doing
so, the middleboxes have to impose themselves between the communication end-points,
which is against the design principles of the original Internet and a source of complications
both for the management of networks and design of application protocols.
In this thesis, we design a clean-slate network architecture that is a better t with the
current use of the Internet. We present a name resolution system based on name-based
routing. It matches with the service access and data retrieval oriented usage of the Internet,
and takes the network imposed middleboxes properly into account. We then propose
modest addressing-related changes to the network layer as a remedy for the denial of
service attacks. Finally, we take steps towards a data-oriented communications API that
provides better decoupling for applications from the network stack than the original
Sockets API does. e improved decoupling both simplies applications and allows
them to be unaected by evolving network technologies: in this architecture, coping
with intermittent connectivity and heterogenous network technologies is a burden of the
network stack.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the 25 years since becoming commercially available, the Internet has grown into a global
communication infrastructure connecting a signicant part of mankind and become an
important part of modern society. Its impressive growth has been fostered by innovative
applications, many of which were completely unforeseen by the Internet’s inventors.
While fully acknowledging ingenuity and creativity of application designers, it is equally
impressive how little the core architecture of the Internet has evolved during this time.
e foundation of the Internet is the Internet Protocol (IP).is protocol provides
a strikingly simple service for the Internet-connected hosts: it transmits blocks of data,
datagrams, from one host to another over interconnected networks [107]. Moreover, it
doesn’t even guarantee if, or when, the datagrams will be delivered; the provided delivery
service is “best-eort” in nature, in that the Internet tries its best to deliver each packet,
but makes not guarantees. Instead, it is the responsibility of hosts and their transport
protocol implementations to split application data into approriate blocks and retransmit
any lost datagrams as necessary. is simplicity helped the Internet to interconnect a
wide variety of networks.
e original Internet addressing scheme was another important aspect of its design.
Every host on Internet had an unique IP address, which is numeric and xed to 32 bits in
size.e address consisted of two parts: a network component (identifying the network
the host was on) and host component (identifying the host uniquely on that network).
Every transmitted datagram contained both a source IP address and destination IP address;
i.e., by inspecting a packet one could determine the sending host and the destination host.
For the network, this numeric, xed size, hierarchical IP address format was a key factor
in the feasibility of Internet: the format made the packets easy to process and routers, the
packet forwarding network elements, only needed to inspect the network component of
the address and could remain ignorant about host component. In other words, it was
sucient for routers to exchange information about available routes to dierent networks.
While this addressing structure was well-suited for routers, identifying a remote host
with its numeric IP address wasmuch less convenient for users. Awelcomed improvement
to the user-experience was the establishment of a directory mapping host names to their
corresponding IP addresses. Users on their terminals could then identify hosts using
easy-to-remember names and it became the responsibility of the hosts to translate these
names into IP addresses before initiating any communication with a remote host.e
rst implementation of the name directory was implemented in a centralized fashion,
and its contents were merely replicated to every host on the Internet, but as the number
of connected hosts increased, a more scalable directory implementation quickly became
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necessary.
e Domain Name System (DNS) [93] introduced a distributed name directory for
Internet. Hosts would now use DNS name resolvers to resolve a host name into an IP
address. As with the design of IP itself, scalability was a major concern in the design
of DNS, so naming was organized in a hierachical manner. However, organizational
structures – and not the network structure – typically dened the structure of hierarchy.
is rendered the names even easier to use since the embedded organizational structure
in the names made names easy to remember and understand.
DNS has been a tremendous success and, in many ways, it solved the right problem, in
exactly right way, at right time. However, it is worthwhile to note that DNSwas auxiliary to
the architecture, not an intrinsic part of it. Before DNS (and its predecessor, a centralized
name directory) was deployed, the structure of the basic network protocols (IP and TCP)
were already set: in essence, transport protocols had been build directly on top of IP and
the DNS name resolution became merely an extra step to execute if the plain IP addresses
were not provided by the application. Hence, even though a crucial part of the Internet
today, the role of the naming in the Internet architecture is more result of happenstance
than of thoughtful architecture.
ese two fundamental aspects of networking, addressing and naming, are the very
foundations of Internet and together they form the core of the Internet architecture.
It is astonishing how little they have changed since their inception and well they have
weathered the Internet’s rapid evolution. Indeed, the list of changes to them is very
minimal over the years; only very pressing issues have caused the Internet engineering
community to change them. Below, we describe some of these changes and their causes.
e Internet originally had a single backbone connecting all attached networks: this
eventually became the academic backbone, NSFNET, run byNSF. However, as the Internet
grew, and its commercial usage grew even faster, in 1995 NSF nally decided it was
no longer appropriate for it to fund and maintain the Internet backbone, which had
outgrown from its original academic role. In the name of competition, the single backbone
network was replaced by multiple commercial backbones.e original Internet routing
protocols, which exchanged the vital routing information between the routers, didn’t t
the new decentralized backbone structure of Internet NSF wanted to establish. Hence,
the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) was developed and deployed. Unlike the original
routing protocols, it allowed the networks to implement autonomous interdomain routing
policies, which essentially were rules how to route network trac in a way that was most
economical for the owner of the network.
At the same time, the growth of Internet was causing increasing concerns about the
scalability of Internet; assignable IP addresses were running out and routing table growth
was accelerating at a worrying rate. To address these concerns, Classless Inter-Domain
Routing (CIDR) [58] was successfully deployed.e original IP address format had led to
inecient address allocation and did not support hierarchical address aggregation, which
would have limited the routing table growth. CIDR replaced the xed number of classes
with variable sized address classes, enabling both better address aggregation and more
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ecient address allocation practices.
While the deployment of CIDR and its extensions to BGP were well controlled and
designed, address exhaustion introduced a less controlled change to Internet: Network
Address Translation (NAT). Before NAT, every connected host on Internet had a unique
IP address. NAT capable devices changed this. NAT capable routers allowed a network of
hosts to share a single IP address; the NAT router would translate private host addresses
to a public IP address (and vice versa) on the y for the packets it forwarded. Even though
they broke a fundamental design principle of Internet, as NATs modied packets between
the source and destination of the packets, NATs solved an important real-world problem
and quickly became commonplace.
ese changes — BGP, CIDR, and NATs — are the most fundamental architectural
changes the Internet has seen since its inception. Each of these arose due to a change in
the Internet’s usage: moving from monolithic research network to composite commercial
network, from small routing tables to rapidly growing routing tables, and from plentiful
addresses to scarce addresses. However, there is now another set of changes in the
Internet’s usage, and these might also require architectural accommodation. We now
discuss four of these changes and their implications.
e Internet architecture was developed around host-to-host applications, such
as telnet and p, and the vast majority of its current usage is service access and data
retrieval. While less host-oriented applications have existed from the very beginning of
the Internet, the World Wide Web was the rst popular application to move away from
the prevailing host-orientation.e World Wide Web simplied the use of Internet and
promptly increasing amount of services, packed with content, were created. Peer-to-peer
applications lowered the technical barrier for data retrieval further and transformed
the sharing of digital content. However, without underestimating the signicance of
these applications, the evolution of applications has been universal, and indeed, in some
sense, all networking nowadays revolves around content. Some have even argued the
content-orientation to be the next era of networking [72].
e Internet has its roots in academia. Openness was considered a critical success
factor – aer all, thiswas alignedwith the academic roots of Internet – and every connected
host received equal treatment. Unfortunately, the same openness that helped to boost
the innovation of Internet applications now oers little or no protection for connected
organizations and individuals; it is no coincidence that criminals have found ample
opportunities on Internet. Today, the Internet is a critical infrastructure and the global
economy is increasingly dependent on it. For malicious users it is easy to exploit the
many security aws of major operating systems and their applications to accumulate large
botnets, which can launch devastating Denial of Service attacks.
Internet connectivity has become more and more ubiquitous. is has resulted in
a variety of Internet connectivity options; both wireless and wired. Unfortunately, a
consequence of the improved connectivity has been the varying quality of end-to-end
connectivity. Some hosts are well connected (when attached to wired Internet), and
others (e.g., mobile hosts) have very intermittent connectivity – and indeed, disruptions
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in connectivity are increasingly familiar nuisance for majority of Internet users. In some
more extreme networks, one can’t expect end-to-end connectivity to ever exist.
Finally, the original Internet was a purely transparent carrier of packets, whereas
today such a perfect transparency is rarely the case. Network devices inspecting and
modifying packets, or even responding to packets not destined to them are commonplace.
e practice unquestionably challenges the early design principles of the Internet, but
such middlebox devices are of denite value to users. e middleboxes both improve
the performance of popular applications and provide protection for the network and its
connected hosts. For instance, it was the World Wide Web which made HTTP caches
popular, and these caches were designed to benet the users. In general, if an application
becomes popular, it is only natural that a part of its functionality gets moved into the
network to improve the application performance. In a similar manner, while deep packet
inspecting rewalls violate the design principles of the Internet, their role in providing
practical securing methods for network administrators is hard to challenge.
1.1 Problem
e Internet does its job amazingly well. However, the radical departure from its original
usage is a source of discomfort for network administrators, application developers, and
for network engineers working on improving the Internet.erefore, in this thesis we
ask: what would the network stack look like if we were to design it around the contemporary
requirements for internetworking?
Considering the grand-scale of the question, we limit our scope and focus on the
design of three essential features of any internetworking-capable communications stack:
a) addressing in the network layer, b) naming, and c) programming abstractions provided
for applications.
• e network layer provides the connectivity over interconnected networks. As
discussed above, the packet-switching nature of the original Internet design has
proven its value as an interconnection layer, but yet, in the current Internet, the
network layer fails to protect its connected hosts.erefore, we seek to understand
how the network layer, and addressing in particular, should change in order to
implement the packet forwarding in a more secure manner.
• Whereas the design of the network layer is essential for the feasibility of the network
itself, eventually it’s the naming that provides applications with a usable abstraction:
the naming system translates application friendly names into network addresses.1
erefore, the challenge is to come up with a naming system that best meets the
needs of modern applications.
• Finally, a network stack must provide applications with an interface to the
communication service it implements.e communications Application Program-
ming Interface (API) provides the critical programming abstractions application
1Transport protocols are certainly essential in providing reliable connectivity on top of the packet
forwarding service of a network layer.
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developers need to interact with the stack. In the API design, the challenge is in
various trade-os: the API should be convenient for the developers to use, generic
enough not to change drastically over the time as technologies evolve, and yet it
should be feasible to implement.
We note that the test of any architecture is whether it accommodates both current and
expected (and unexpected) usage.erefore, we note our success in solving the above
challenges is not measured in the quantity of novel ideas we can establish for any of
the sub-problems, but how well the resulting network architecture ts together with its
current and foreseeable usage.
Moreover, we note our focus leaves out important features for any network stack:
• Protocol layers below the network layer are not in our scope since our focus is on
the internetworking and not local area networking.
• Transport, session, and application protocols are not addressed here.
• Management aspects of networks.
However, at the same breath, we point that much of the research conducted on the above
omitted issues is orthogonal to the design of the network layer, naming, and programming
abstractions.erefore, we expect our eorts to be largely complementary with the eorts
focusing on the issues outside of our scope.
1.2 Design Principles
ree high-level design principles have guided us throughout the design process:
Principle #1: Naming and addressing should support the use of Internet.
As discussed above, the current role of naming in Internet architecture is not the result
of careful architectural craing; instead, it was an add-on to the core architecture when
the most of its critical design (IP and transport protocols) was already set. Moreover,
the design of naming was constrained by scalability concerns. In a similar manner, in
the design of Internet addressing, scalability was a priority that set the direction of the
design process. Here, we set our priorities dierently: we aim to design the addressing
and naming for the use of Internet. While obviously scalability is a concern even today,
we challenge ourselves to seek solutions that are on the edge of being feasible and then
count on improving hardware to ensure continued feasibility.
As a result of this principle, in our design names and addresses are at. In other words,
the names and addresses don’t contain any structure nor semantics. However, they do
have a cryptographic meaning as the names embed a cryptographic hash of a public key.
is simple, and strikingly elegant, mechanism of constructing names and addresses will
be repeating throughout the thesis, and we’ll see how on it becomes the foundation for a
network architecture meeting today’s needs.
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Principle #2: Favor commodity hardware components.
is principle largely follows from rst principle. History has shown that the
commodity hardware components develop at a very favorable rate; they get cheaper, faster
and more featureful. While the Internet architecture should not depend on any particular
hardware realization, it would be best if it could be implemented with commodity
hardware.e closer we are to using commodity hardware components in the design
space, the better guarantee there is of steady and favorable development of the necessary
components. In many ways, the history of Internet routing is an contradicting example
and demonstrate what we want to avoid: CIDR introduced the tough requirement of
longest prex matching, which at least in the beginning, made custom made memory
chips, Ternary Content-Addressable Memories (TCAM), a necessity since the longest
prex matching was challenging to implement at high constant rates required by the
Internet core.
However, we emphasize the principle is not to suggest there wouldn’t be a place for
special hardware. On the contrary, positioning functionality to the hardware components
is oen the most desirable point in the entire design space. For example, trusted hardware
would provide a valuable security solution: once the implementation of a functionality
is provided in hardware solely, circumventing the functionality becomes much more
challenging compared to exploiting of a soware implementation.
Principle #3: Don’t build everything into the network architecture, but assume that
complementary infrastructures will arise to ll in the necessary functionality.
We have strived for elegance and simplicity in the design in order to establish a solid
foundation for applications built on the resulting network architecture.2 Hence, we do
not seek an architecture that implements every need, but instead, we assume the omitted
aspects can be built on top of the foundations we establish – and yet, that the resulting
architecture oers an attractive platform for such missing future aspects.
is principle hits to the essence of a common counter-argument against the use
of at identiers. While they have attractive properties for naming and addressing (as
we’ll show), their direct exposure to users is next to impossible; 128 bits (or more) long
identiers are hardly user-friendly. Indeed, they are even less user-friendly than the
original 32 bits long IP addresses of Internet, which were already a reason to establish
human-friendly naming on top of them. However, we emphasize that by setting our
priorities dierently, if nothing else, we can demonstrate how dierent approach to
naming and addressing can have simplifying implications to the problems dicult to
resolve on the Internet today.
1.3 Contributions
e contributions of this thesis are architectural. Many of the central ideas have existed in
the research community for a long time, and we have merely borrowed them.erefore,
2Indeed, in many mays, we have merely followed C.A.R. Hoare’s now famous statement about the
relationship of simplicity and reliability: “e price of reliability is the pursuit of the utmost simplicity.”
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it’s the synthesis of these ideas into a coherent network architecture that we claim to be
our contribution. In the following sections, the main contributions are introduced in
more detail.
1.3.1 Name Resolution
e main contribution of this thesis is the design of a clean-slate name resolution
system that helps the Internet meet the requirements it faces today. We call the
anycast-based name resolution infrastructure the Data-Oriented (and Beyond) Network
Architecture (DONA). Its design is discussed in detail in Publication I.
As discussed above, modern usage of the Internet revolves largely around content
and services, which is very dierent from the original host-oriented use of the Internet,
for which the addressing and naming of the Internet was originally designed. It is our
contribution to demonstrate how to design a naming and name resolution system to
provide the necessary support for this data-oriented usage. When it comes to naming,
there are three issues an Internet user cares about:
• Persistence. Users expect the names of the content and services to remain
unchanged over time and over changes in the location of hosting.
• Availability. Users expect the named content and services to be available regardless
of service and network failures.
• Authenticity. Users expect the content to be authentic; in essence, users don’t care
about the where the content comes from, but that it’s authentic (i.e., was generated
by the source they expected generated the data).
Moreover, the modern Internet has stakeholders between the end-points that the original
design didn’t consider since they were not present at that time. In addition to supporting
the data-oriented use of Internet, our contribution is to show how to design a name
system to take these various new “middle” stakeholders into account.
Finally, we note that a naming system can take pressure o of the network layer below;
once the name system provides an anycast primitive, it reduces the need for the network
layer to support anycast.
1.3.2 Network Layer
While one could use DONA to replace many of the current network-layer routing
functions (and instead have the network layer use source-routes), the resulting design
is too extreme. Such a design would make the host responsible for reacting in changing
network connectivity: if the path between two end-points changes, the end-points must
re-establish their connectivity through the naming system.
While tempting to overload DONA with routing functionality, the design presented
here still uses the network layer for basic routing. However, we do not deal with routing in
this thesis, but instead focus on the main unsolved problem at the network layer: Denial
of Service attacks.
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e critical feature IP lacks today is accountability; the hosts on Internet are not
enforced to be responsible for their actions. At high-level, our observation follows very
much the principles of modern societies; while preventing crimes is important, it’s even
more important to make stakeholders responsible for their crimes. It is our contribution
to design a network layer that resolves the security problems of current IP by establishing
a rm concept of accountability at the network layer.
We call the resulting design Accountable Internet Protocol (AIP) and discuss its design
in detail in Publication II. In short, we show that the required changes to IP are in the
structure of addresses. Moreover, we show that the required changes are rather modest in
nature; we merely replace xed size longest prex matching addresses with stacks of at
identiers having cryptographicmeaning. Indeed, inmanyways, we take a step backwards
in the history of Internet to the era before CIDR. Once the addressing establishes such a
strong notion of identity, the network can eciently provide hosts a trustable mechanism
to shut-o unwanted trac as well as prevent address forgeries.
1.3.3 Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)
Today, an application’s main interface to the TCP/IP stack is the Sockets API.e sole
goal behind this design was to provide an interface to the main transport protocols of
that time, TCP and UDP. It was a response to a pressing need: applications needed an
interface, and hence, considering long term implications was beyond the scope.
As a result, the Sockets API is inherently tightly coupled to the underlaying
communications stack and to the properties of its protocols. Unfortunately, this means
that protocol changes ripple into applications.e deployment eorts of IPv6 are a sad
example of this: simple quadrupling the address length required years for applications to
adapt. (Although, admittedly, the deployment rate itself didn’t enforce developers to act
faster.)
Tight coupling between applications and the communication protocols has another
eect. In the presence of intermittent connectivity (e.g., due to popularizing wireless
connectivity and device power management) modern applications have to deal with
connection problems not prevalent in the wired Internet: connectivity comes and goes,
dierent interfaces are active at dierent times, and so on. Moreover, it’s challenging
for legacy applications to support the emerging communications networks where the
end-to-end connectivity between hosts is a rare event.
It is our rst contribution to exemplify the practical implications of intermittent
connectivity conditions for applications and then design the necessary protocol extensions
for two major secure session protocols, Secure Shell (SSH) and Transport Layer
Security (TLS) protocol. We’ll discuss their design and challenges in Publication III.
It’s our second contribution to design and take steps towards a modern communica-
tions API that enables better decoupling of the communications stack and applications.
is decoupling establishes the very features challenging to provide with the Sockets API:
• Evolution. Once applications and the stack become decoupled, they may evolve
independently. In other words, ideally, with such an API, the applications will
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remain unchanged even new network technologies and protocols are deployed
below the API.
• Heterogeneous connectivity. It seems inevitable that there will be more and
more connectivity technologies available for devices. In addition to supporting
unexpected future network technologies better, the decoupling can free the
applications from the problem of using communications resources eciently. If the
stack is smart enough, the application remains unaware of the various connectivity
options in use.
e result of our API design is a communications API based on publish/subscribe
primitives. While the research community has considered the publish/subscribe
primitives as an attractive programming abstraction for a long time, it’s our contribution
to propose an initial concrete design using these primitives as the basis of a generic
communications API. We discuss the details of the resulting API in Publication IV.
1.4 Author’s Contributions
e author’s role and contributions were as follows:
• Publication I (12 p.): e author was the architect, team leader, and prototype
developer in the research project resulting in Data-Oriented (and Beyond) Network
Architecture (DONA).
• Publication II (7 p.): e author was a member of the Accountable Internet
Protocol (AIP) architecture design team, and was especially responsible for the
mechanisms involved in areas of scalability and trac engineering.
• Publication III (12 p.):e author was the main developer and codesigner of the
secure session protocol extensions.
• Publication IV (7 p.): e author shared the architect’s role together with
another student (Mike Demmer), who was responsible for the Disruption-Tolerant
Networking aspects of the API design – while the author was responsible for the
design for the other half, the wired Internet.
1.5 Structure of theesis
e thesis has the following structure. In the following chapter, we’ll go through the
essential background of our contributions.e chapter is followed by a conclusion, which
aer the actual original publications will follow, one publication per a chapter.
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Chapter 2
Background
is thesis is about designing a clean-slate network stack for internetworking. Covering
the related research here in its full depth and variety would require a book of its own,
even with our already limited scope. To reduce it to a manageable length, our review of
the necessary background will be limited to a few seminal papers from the past and some
recent works that illustrate the issues we address here.ese should prepare a reader new
to the eld of Internet architecture with a high-level overview and a guide to where to
start diving in to the literature for more details.
e structure of this chapter is as follows. We begin with the focal point of this thesis:
addressing and naming.en we discuss the issues the Internet faces today that motivate
the changes proposed herein: the trend towards data-orientation, communication in
challenged networks, the need to control access, and the dicult history of supporting
delivery models beyond the traditional unicast model. We conclude this chapter by
discussing several issues that are necessary context for the material at hand: the
design principles of the Internet, essential cryptographic mechanisms, routing, and basic
communications abstractions.
2.1 Addressing
In [125], Shoch suggested the following terminology for the addressing, naming, and
routing:
• A name identies what you want,
• An address identies where it is, and
• A route identies a way to get there.
ese denitions make the concepts of addressing and naming very concrete. In this
subsection we focus on addressing then continue to naming in 2.2; we come back to
discuss routing in Section 2.4 aer considering motivational issues in 2.3.
At a very high-level, there are only two types of addresses for the networks to use:
• Flat addresses that are free from any network topological information. In other
words, they merely identify the communication end-point, and don’t directly
provide location information. As a result, a network using at addresses must
know the location of every end-point or broadcast the packet in some fashion.
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Perhaps the most widely-spread example of such addresses today are the Ethernet
Local Area Networks (LAN) [90]1.
• Addresses that embed topological information.is form of address determines
the exact network location of the communication end-point, and is therefore very
useful in making forwarding decisions in routers. Using a hierarchical structure for
these topological addresses is the foundation for scalable routing on networks [78]:
at the top of the hierarchy of networks, i.e., in the core of the network, the routers
can remain unaware of the networks in the bottom of hierarchy and only inspect
part of destination address that denes the next hop at their level of hierarchy.
From the network point of view, the topologically-relevant hierarchical addresses are the
most convenient form of addressing, since they scale well and easily provide routers with
the information they need to forward. Indeed, since the original Internet addressing [107],
the addressing has been hierarchical. While in the beginning the level of hierarchy was
limited to two and the addresses consisted of a network and host part, the introduction
of CIDR [59] generalized the hierarchy to improve scaling.
However, IP addresses have also a role beyond determining the location of an end-
point on the Internet; they also serve as end-point identiers. Hence, current IP addresses
serve as identiers to identify the host and as locators to dene the host location in the
Internet. Moreover, the host network stack also uses them as transport connection end-
point identiers when the transport layer above the network layer binds its connections to
the IP addresses. For exactly this reason, supporting host mobility at the network layer is
especially complicated since the end-point identier (i.e., the address) inevitably changes
when a host roams from a network to another.
e site connectivity requirements of the modern Internet demonstrate the contra-
diction of these dual roles. Today sites increasingly prefer multihoming to improve
connection resiliency, but at the same time they prefer to be reachable at a single
address (block) and therefore they need to get a provider independent address (block). As
a result, hierarchical addressing is not an option since provider-independent addressing
does not reect underlying topology. is desire for provider independent addresses
is enforced by administration practicalities as well; IP addresses are oen manually
congured in network devices and applications (e.g., to avoid dependencies to DNS), site
system administrators prefer to have addresses that don’t change even provider would
change. We’ll return to the issue later in Section 2.4.
e dual role of the IP addresses has proven to be problematic and identier-locator
split has been proposed by many to separate the identier and locator roles of the IP
addresses in a clean manner.
e rst concrete identier-locator split proposal was 8+8/GSE [100], which emerged
in the early stages of IPv6 [36] development in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
IPv6 extended the 32-bit address size to 128 bits, and hence, the scalability of IPv6 routing
1Ethernet addresses certainly contain a prex dening the vendor of the network device, i.e., they do
have an internal structure.
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was seen potentially challenging compared to IPv4 routing. 8+8/GSE proposed to have
a stable end-point identier part in IP addresses, whereas the network part could be
changed by routers. In this manner, the network addresses could be assigned in a strictly
hierarchical fashion (thus enabling very good scaling properties for IPv6 routing), whereas
hosts would remain mostly unaware of them. e edge routers of a multi-homed site
would select the most appropriate network part for their hosts.
In the post-portem of the initial IP mobility support development, IETF produced its
next signicant proposal for identier-locator split: Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [94].
In HIP, an (host) identier layer was added between the transport layer and the IP layer.
In this manner, the transport layer could base its operations to stable (cryptographic)
identiers, while the network addresses could change without transport layer seeing the
changes.is explicit notation of identities enables seemingly simple security solutions
compared to pure IP address based mobility solutions [98].
Recent research proposals (e.g., [21]) go even further from the identier-locator split
and get entirely rid of addresses. In such a network, the routing at the network layer occurs
directly on (at) identiers (without any topological information for the network to use),
and thus, the goal of shortest-path routing is sacriced for the benet of the scalability
of routing. (Otherwise, the routers would be required to store information about every
connected host on the Internet, which clearly is not economical nor feasible technically.)
Hence, in essence, the routing on at identiers comes with a price of increased path
stretch, which is the ratio of the resulting path and the shortest available path over the
network.2
While none of the above proposals has been deployed to this date, the role of
the IP addresses has changed over the years. e inception of Network Address
Translators (NAT) and middleboxes [23] has decreased the role of IP addresses as the
communication end-point identiers. NATs andmiddleboxes translate IP addresses in the
networkwithout hosts involvement. In a typical setting, a NAT capable router has the only
public IP address of the site, and it translates between hosts’ private addresses (behind
the NAT) and the public IP address. While hosts can connect to hosts in the Internet,
connecting to these hosts from the Internet can’t be done without special arrangements.
Hence, to re-establish connectivity to the hosts behind NATs, protocols above the network
layer use their own identiers with global meaning. SIP [119] with DNS names is an
increasingly common protocol capable of doing so. Indeed, it has been proposed to use
DNS names as end-point identiers [53, 66] instead of IP addresses in all communication.
FARA [27] represents an abstract model for reasoning about identier-locator split
architectures. In many ways, it pushes the split to the extreme: it has no global addresses at
all, but instead uses Forwarding Directives (FD) in forwarding packets. FDs are sequences
of labels with only local meaning and only together they form a sequence of instructions
how to reach point A from point B on network. In such a model, it’s a responsibility of a
higher layer to construct such sequence of FDs for the network layer. NIRA [150] is an
example of a practical instantiation of this abstract model; it encodes the FDs into IPv6
2For an overlay based approach, see e.g., Internet Indirection Infrastructure [131].
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source and destination addresses. Plutarch [33] takes the last remaining step away from
global addressing and argues that to establish connectivity over heterogenous networks
of the future Internet the network interconnections should merely translate between
network specic addresses (and protocols).
2.2 Naming
As dened by Shoch in [125], names dene what you want. Having such a fundamental
purpose in the networking, one could think naming would be a carefully designed part of
the Internet architecture. However, Internet naming is not a carefully architected design.
Originally Internet naming was organized around centrally distributed text le,
hosts.txt, which contained mappings between host names and their corresponding IP
address. As the Internet grow and became a network connecting workstations instead
of servers, the scalability of this approach was about to reach its limits. It became clear
that the Internet needed a distributed name directory system. However, while other
distributed directory implementations were already available at that time (e.g. [122]), their
scalability was considered too insucient for the Internet. A new more scalable design
was needed. However, at this point of time, much of the design of the TCP/IP suite had
already been nished, and the transport protocols had already bound themselves to IP
addresses.
e Domain Name System (DNS) [93] is organized as a static distributed tree.e
namespace is hierarchical and partitioned into domains, which then may have sub-
domains. e highest domain in the hierarchy is the global root domain. Top level
domains (e.g., .com, .net, and the national domains) are then the sub-domains of this
global root domain. Each domain, with the exception of the root domain, has a human-
readable name, and therefore, to construct a fully qualied domain name it’s sucient to
concatenate the domain names from the leaf to of the tree to the top domain. Since the
hierarchy of domains follows organizational structures, even the fully qualied domain
names remain relatively easy to remember and use.
DNS name resolution begins from the servers of the global root domain and progresses
downwards in the domain hierarchy (each domain having a server) until the full name has
been resolved. In other to avoid the domain servers high in the hierarchy from becoming
the bottleneck for the entire system, DNS uses caching extensively. While resolving, a
domain server doesn’t need to be contacted if a fresh enough response from it to a domain
name query is available.is combination of the hierarchical organization and extensive
caching establishes the attractive scalability properties so critical in the design of DNS.
To this date, DNS remains the primary naming service of Internet. For example, the
names used in World Wide Web, URI/URLs [12, 15] contain a DNS name, and so do the
email addresses. And indeed, the DNS names have become a visible part of applications
used by so many. However, many of the challenges DNS faces stem exactly from its very
success:
• e DNS namespace has become contentious. Short, especially easy to remember,
names having market value have become more popular (and thus, more valuable)
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than the rest of the names. In essence, this results in a trend towards a atter and
atter namespace, which is very much against the original design principles of
DNS.
• Names have become more dynamic.e design of DNS assumed relatively static
bindings between host names and their IP addresses. However, nowadays the names
are extensively used in applications, which prefer the names to remain persistent
over the time; aer all, this maximizes the user-friendliness of applications. A
practical example is the problem of changing Web URLs: since an URL embeds a
DNS name (used as a service name), the binding of a DNS name and an IP address
has to change when the content moves from a host to another. As a practical
solution, the caching time of corresponding DNS names is oen limited to be
articially low. While mostly solving the problem, this is again in contradiction
with the original design principles.
• e level of DNS security doesn’t match with the critical role of DNS. While DNS
has a distributed implementation, the domain information it stores is oen not
properly distributed. It’s typical to host the domain information of individual
domains using only a few servers. Hence, by attacking only a few critical servers,
the resolution of individual domain names can be severely impaired. Moreover,
since the overall operation of DNS depends on the global root name servers, they
are equally attractive targets for attacks.3 Finally, the domain information itself is
not secured in DNS, i.e., a host resolving a name has today little means to verify the
integrity and origin of the name resolution responses. Eorts to deploy security
extensions to DNS are still ongoing [5].
Indeed, these aspects have caused the research community to actively seek alternatives
to DNS. It has been argued the core Internet architecture should not embed such a non-
neutral aspect as human-readable names at all but it should focus on providing persistent
names [8, 143, 144]. In essence, this is asking for a depart from the hierarchical naming
to at identiers. As a result, alternative approaches are needed for the scalability of the
naming system since the name hierarchy itself can’t be used anymore to establish the
scalability properties. Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) have been a promising but yet
tricky research direction. DHTs can provide logarithmic number of resolution hops (in
relation to the number of nodes). Unfortunately, their implementation and especially
management have proven to be non-trivial [117]. Instead of replacing the DNS names
with at names, it has also been proposed to re-build DNS on DHTs [112].is would
tackle especially the problems of the DNS security and the dynamic nature of the names.
Finally, while the Internet naming has been dominated by the model of translating
a (hierarchical) name into an address, the increasing popularity of mobile devices has
driven the research community to propose radical departures from this name translation
paradigm. In dynamic networks consisting of mobile devices, the network can much
3As we will see in Section 2.3, anycast can help to secure the root servers.
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better assist hosts in nding their resources and services, if the hosts express their intent
instead of compressing the intent into a name. In [3], Adjie-Winoto et al. propose a simple
language for the task. A more recent proof of the benets of the approach is presented
in [132]. In a similar manner arguing in favor of infrastructureless name resolution, it
has been argued that in such networks (perhaps without any infrastructural support) the
naming shouldn’t be laid out according to the organizational structures but based on social
networks users and their devices form. Unmanaged Internet Architecture (UIA) [51] is
one concrete proposal taking steps towards this kind of vision.
2.3 Issues
In this section, we discuss the major issues the Internet faces.
2.3.1 Data-orientation
When Tim Berners Lee invented the World Wide Web in the late 1980s, he had no idea
the extent of the impact it would have on the Internet, and the world. Today, the Web is
the primary mechanism for Internet information retrieval and the Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP) [49], the key protocol of the Web, carries a major portion of the overall
Internet trac. HTTP’s original protocol design followed a strictly client-server model,
but as the Web became popular additional elements were incorporated into the design.
e increasing trac volumes of popular web sites combined with consumer
availability and performance requirements led to he development and deployment of
caching HTTP proxies. HTTP proxies were designed to absorb some of the load born by
web servers: instead of sending content requests directly to web servers, web browsers
sent their requests to a local HTTP proxy, which then served a cached copy of the content
without contacting the web site at all – if it had happened to have a fresh-enough copy
of the content. While in the beginning many researchers had the goal of deploying an
Internet-wide hierarchy of caches, it soon became obvious the benets of such caching
hierarchies didn’t justify their deployment eorts [147]. Hence, HTTP proxies are mainly
deployed at the edge networks, where the benets are clear and deployment easy.
Despite the widespread use of proxies, major web sites continued to experience
increasing trac volumes, and at the same time the published web content got richer in
quality.e major web sites continued to seek for mechanisms to improve the loading
times of their web pages and to reduce the load on their servers. is opened an
opportunity for Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) operated by companies like
Akamai.
CDNs are networks of globally distributed HTTP proxies.4 Typically the proxies are
placed near critical trac junctions of the Internet. To ooad content requests from a
web site to the CDN, the web site modies links on its web pages to point the CDN’s
domain name instead of its own. In this manner, the DNS servers of the CDN network get
queried when a web browser initiates the downloading of the referenced content. Based
on the incoming DNS query the CDN then determines which of its HTTP proxies is the
4CDNs have extended their protocol support since their early days, though.
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closest to the user and should respond to the content request. By then responding to the
DNS query with the IP address of the HTTP proxy, the web browser gets directed to this
proxy. While the design of CDNs is a set of carefully conceived and integrated tricks,
rather than a principled architecture, they remain to be the primary form of assisting
performance-challengedweb sites. However, since their services are commercial, they also
remain an unrealistic option to many non-commercial, but popular sites. As a response,
the research community has produced their own, free for use, CDNs (see, e.g., [54]).
In addition to the Web, content-sharing peer-to-peer applications was another new
class of applications that arose in the 1990s.e source of their success was their ability to
operate without any xed infrastructure: the hosts running the applications formed the
infrastructure by themselves. Without needing any expensive support from CDNs and
without being controlled by anyone, these peer-to-peer networks quickly lled with vast
amounts of (oen illegal) content. Suddenly, distributing even large content les had come
within reach of anyone who could download and install such a peer-to-peer application.
And for the more established peer-to-peer applications, such as BitTorrent [17], the
installation certainly isn’t dicult.
Since an increasingly large portion of Internet usage revolves around content
distribution, and yet the Internet was designed to connect hosts and not to distribute
content, it has been proposed by many in the research community that there is reason to
reconsider the design of the Internet:
• In their seminal work, TRIAD [65], Gritter and Cheriton formulate a response to
the increasing popularity of HTTP.ey suggest embedding much of the HTTP’s
functionality into the Internet architecture itself. In TRIAD, URLs identify end-
points and routing occurs based on them; IP addresses are merely used as transient
routing labels in fetching content aer a name-based routingmechanism has routed
the content request to the closest copy of the content.
• In a recent research proposal [140], Venkataramani and Towsley argue for a similar
architectural role for BitTorrent as TRIAD did for HTTP: they argue that the
robustness of the underlying swarmingmechanisms of the BitTorrent is a reason to
consider whether the Internet architecture could be based on swarming.
• In [72], Van Jacobson boldly argues the next era of networking should be content-
centric networking. He claims the content domination to be already so prevalent
that the packet switching era of the original Internet architecture has come to its
end.
All these proposals share a reliance on a publish/subscribe communication model:
applications fetching content subscribe to content published by other applications. While
perhaps new in the context of network research for some, it’s worthwhile to note the
generality and power of the publish/subscribe model has been well known in systems
research, where the decoupling of publishing and subscribing in both time and space
has been considered an attractive complexity-reducing property in building distributed
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systems [41].e decoupling allows a subscriber both to subscribe to content before or
aer its publishing and to remain ignorant about its location. (In a similar manner, a
publisher knows little about subscribers’ interest in its content.)
Most advanced publish/subscribe systems implement content-based routing; sub-
scribers dene lters that match the content they are interested in instead of specifying
individual publication names. While this enhances the generality and appeal of the
publish/subscribe systems, implementing such content-based routing at large scale
remains to be a challenging task even when done for an individual application (see,
e.g., [4, 24, 105]). Indeed, the challenge of designing, implementing, and deploying a
content-based publish/subscribe system at Internet-scale has been cited as a reason to
reconsider the paradigm of content-based routing and to split it into more manageable
subparts [109].
2.3.2 Challenged Internet
In the computer networking era before the Internet, computers were connected to smaller
local area networks, and to reach remote computers beyond the local network they had
to establish dial-up connections over the phone network.e communication protocols
of that time, such as UUCP (Unix to Unix CoPy), were designed for such intermittent
connectivity: a sending system queued the work requests, opened a dial-up connection,
sent them to the remote system(s), and later polled the system(s) for results. Email could
be sent even over multiple hops – as long as the sender dened its path through the
system. When later integrated with the Internet mail system [70], UUCP mail reached
networks beyond the xed Internet. e resulting model was very general as it made
few assumptions about the networking technologies and did not require end-to-end
connectivity between the sender and receiver of messages.
Once Internet connectivity became widespread, the use of dial-up oriented protocols
largely disappeared. However, the Internet is again entering era where not every host can
be assumed to have a xed Internet connection.is development is mainly due to two
rather dierent reasons:
• Network connectivity is continuously expected to reach new places. However, it’s
evident that providing end-to-end connectivity is an unrealistic assumption in
many extreme conditions. For example, in many interplanetary and underwa-
ter (submarine) contexts, connectivity is only available in certain periods [42].
• Network connectivity is available on an increasing variety of mobile devices, but
oen this network connectivity is intermittent. is dynamic environment is
challenging for applications to support.
In response, the research community has produced numerous proposals.e IRTF
led Disruption-Tolerant Networking (DTN) eort [25] has its roots in interplanetary
communications. It discards the assumption of end-to-end connectivity and instead
builds on the founding ideas of UUCP and Internet mail service: instead of providing
a byte-oriented end-to-end connection service for applications, the applications are
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expected to transmit and receive self-contained messages.e communication system
then delivers the messages, by perhaps storing them for long periods of time on their way
from the sender to receiver.
Haggle [132] is another important proposal focusing on the networking challenges
of modern mobile devices. It provides applications with a generic content-based pub-
lish/subscribe like API that eectively decouples applications from the communications
system.eAPI lets the applications to expose their data and relatedmetadata, and remain
ignorant much of the communications details (network interfaces, names, protocols).
e few assumptions applications make about networking technology enables the Haggle
implementation then to orchestrate the use of communication resources in a way it best
can meet the applications’ needs, whether the mobile device was connected to the xed
Internet or to an ad-hoc network of mobile devices.
2.3.3 Controlled Access
It was the openness of Internet that largely facilitated its growth.e fact that the network
placed no limits on connectivity meant that as innovative applications could be deployed
without obstacles. However, the very same openness has nowmade protecting the network
from malicious hosts very dicult. While rudimentary security measures solve most of
the problems (e.g., security holes in applications can be patched and end-to-end security
protocols can be deployed), the openness has created a class of attacks that are hard to
defend against: Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. In a DoS attack, a victim host is ooded
with packets it didn’t intend to receive. If the attacker is equipped with resources to send
more packets than the victim can receive, the victim’s Internet connectivity is eectively
shut down: the ooded packets override any legitimate trac on the victim’s Internet
connection.
e early DoS attacks took advantage of the fact that IP addresses are easy to forge. If
the attacker repeated the same process on multiple well-connected hosts, it could easily
generate enough trac to block the victim’s connection, and yet remain unaccountable
for its actions. Aer all, the source address of the sent packets was pointing away from
the attacker.
e problem looked seemingly simple to solve: it would be sucient to ask ISPs to
install packet lters on their customer facing routers.e lters would drop any incoming
packets with invalid source addresses [48]. In essence, if according to the routing table
a source IP address shouldn’t be sent to a link, any trac from that source IP address
shouldn’t be accepted from that link either.e approach is oen called unicast Reverse
Path Forwarding (uRPF). is was soon a recommended practice for ISPs [77], but
unfortunately, the lters create another manual management task for ISPs. Keeping the
lters up-to-date requires extra work, and moreover, the practice isn’t feasible anywhere
but near the edges of the Internet. In the core, asymmetric routes make use of uRPF based
ltering impossible: in the presence of asymmetric routes, trac from an address may
be received from another link than the trac to the address is sent to. is translates
into a requirement for near ubiquitous deployment of the lters, which is a dicult
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goal to reach.5 In practice, developing and deploying automatic mechanisms for lter
management is also challenging [38, 103].
e rst proposals against the source address forgery (or spoong as it’s oen called)
argued the need to establish traceback functionality in the Internet (see, e.g., [14, 121, 128]).
e traceback functionality would allow the victimhosts to determinewhere themalicious
trac is coming from, regardless of the spoofed addresses. Most of these proposals are
based on the idea of letting routers to store path information in the little-used identication
header of the IPv4 header. is required modifying some part of the Internet routers,
and therefore, traceback was never deployed.
As the Internet has grown, the rogue communities have created sophisticated tools to
exploit security aws of the connected hosts’ operating systems and applications. In the
worst case, the criminals have gained access to millions of hosts [40].ey control these
hosts using sophisticated decentralized controllers to launch attacks and send distributed
spam. When such botnets of hijacked computers is used to launch a DoS attack, the
victims receive perfectly valid packets from an immense number of seemingly valid hosts.
Since the attackers hide themselves behind the compromised hosts, they don’t even need
to spoof IP addresses anymore. If preventing source IP address spoong was challenging,
protecting from this kind of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks has proven to
be even more challenging.
All the numerous proposals to mitigate the eect of DDoS attacks attempt to empower
the hosts to control which hosts are able to send packets for them – which is something
very dierent from the original design principles of the Internet.
In capability based approaches such as Staless Internet Flow Filter (SIFF) [149] and
TVA [151], an Internet connected server authorizes any clients connecting to it by assigning
them unforgeable, ne-grained, and relatively short-living capabilities.e capabilities
are tickets providing non-rate-limited access to the server: if a connecting client host
doesn’t attach a valid capability to its packets, the network will rate-limit its packets.e
privileged trac can be prioritized over the non-privileged trac. e rate-limiting
capability checking mechanism must be implemented in the routers’ data-path. Hence,
the capability implementation must be light-weight enough for gigabit speeds.
Instead of requiring changes to the data-path, which is next to impossible achieve,
it has been proposed routers’ existing ltering mechanisms should be used [6]. Once a
victim can remotely control whether packets destined to it should be ltered, the victim
can install the required lters by itself without any manual help from the ISPs. e
approach doesn’t scale to the Internet core since even in the high-end routers number of
available lters is rather limited.erefore, the key is provide victims of DDoS attacks
control of the edge routers’ lters. However, with this approach, the routers must record
the path packets take as only the the victim knows which upstream router to ask to install
lters for it. In [124], Shaw pushes the case of remote congurable lters even further and
argues the lters should be installed into trac sending hosts. Aer all, most users are
5It has been shown the deployment of source address ltering remains to be incomplete: according
to [16] around 23% of networks use either no ltering at all or their conguration is incomplete.
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well-intented, but likely to be unaware their host participates to a DDoS attack. Hence,
the users are willing to give such control over their outbound trac as long as the remote
hosts can only lter the trac destined to them.
However, as argued in [67], a fundamental circle of problems remains unsolved: as
long as the address spoong remains feasible, deploying automatic ltering mechanisms
remains challenging. And as long as lters are not deployed, address spoong remains to
be a useful tool for attackers and and complicates the deployment of lters. Indeed the
diculty of solving the DDoS problem has led the research community to ask whether
the very openness of Internet should be removed. Handley et al. propose moving towards
asymmetric connectivity model as a solution: if client addresses were made non-global
and hence clients were prevented from communicating directly with each other, as well
as, servers were prevented from connecting clients directly, attackers’ ability to obtain
and control vast number of client hosts would be severely limited.
2.3.4 Delivery Models
e Internet was designed around the unicast delivery model.erefore, it is well-suited
for host-oriented communication, i.e., sending packets from a host to another. However,
over the years, the evolving usage of the Internet has asked for additional delivery models.
Unfortunately, these models have proven to be dicult to provide in the context of an
Internet designed for unicast.
Anycast
In many networking situations, a group of servers implements a network service and
clients have little preference over which of the servers they connect to, the only exception
being that ideally the connected server would be the closest of the servers. If network
can support server selection, the load on servers is better balanced and clients receive
better service. Moreover, host conguration can remain unchanged even the server
congurations and locations change, or if the host roams from one network to another.
Anycast provides exactly this functionality.
In [104], Partridge et al. dene IP anycast, in which the selection of the closest service is
done at the datagram granularity. It becomes the responsibility of the IP routing protocols
to set routing tables properly for anycast IP addresses. While ideal for discovering UDP
datagram based network layer services, the IP layer anycast isn’t a nice t with TCP
based services; aer all, nothing guarantees all datagrams of a TCP ow get routed to
the same server. Moreover, to render to an IP address as an anycast address, it needs to
be individually advertised in the BGP. However, this poses a severe scalability challenge.
Hence, the use of IP anycast remains very limited: the primary users of IP anycast remain
to be the global DNS root servers, which are moving towards the use of IP anycast to
improve both their scalability and resilience against DoS attacks [68].
However, since the anycast delivery model is so appealing for service discovery,
alternative approaches to implement anycast have been proposed and even deployed
in a limited scale. In [74], Katabi et al. divide anycast IP addresses into categories based
on the popularity of the related service. By providing shortest paths only for the most
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popular services and using less optimal default routes for less popular services, the IP
anycast can remain scalable the routers don’t need to waste space in their routing tables for
little used services. In [9] Ballani et al. discuss their design (and give a hint of deployment
plans) of an approach using proxies to enhance the scalability of the IP anycast. In their
model, anycast proxies advertise multiple services as a single anycast IP address block.
Hence, the routing table is not polluted with individual service entries, but it becomes a
scalability problem of proxies to determine the closest server for an incoming request. If
proxies are placed near the critical interconnections point of the Internet, the length of
resulting paths is close to the ones provided by pure IP anycast.
Challenges in implementing and using anycast at the IP layer have driven the
development of application-layer anycast mechanisms, which remain to be most widely
deployed anycast mechanisms today since they both are usable with TCP-based services
and avoid the interaction with the network layer routing.ese proposals are typically
based on modied authoritative DNS servers, which provide their DNS clients with client
specic responses, i.e., the resolution result depends on the client dened properties [45]
or on the IP address of the client. e latter requires the DNS server to be capable of
mapping IP addresses to their geospatial locations (for a design example, see e.g., [55]).
CDNs discussed in Section 2.3.1 typically use application-layer anycast to select the closest
caching proxy. Finally, we note that overlay networks can also provide anycast based
primitive (e.g., [131]); however, these approaches, in addition to being complicated since
not being able to rely on IP anycast in establishing proximity of clients and servers, require
modications to both clients and servers.
Multicast
Multicast is a primitive with a wide range of applications in distributed systems; it provides
an ecient mechanism for delivering datagrams to a group of hosts. However, while
very useful, interdomain IP multicast has a dicult history. Obstacles for its wide-scale
deployment have ranged from the scalability challenges to questioning its economical
feasibility.
Until Deering and Cheriton presented the IP multicast service model and their
extensions to distance-vector and link-state routing protocols [35], multicast was believed
to have signicance only in local area networks.eir ideas resulted in Distance Vector
Multicast Routing Protocol (DVMRP) [142], which has its foundations in reverse-path
ooding. In DVMRP, multicast trees are source-based: routers of a single administrative
domain maintain a shortest-path delivery tree per a multicast source for every group.
DVMRP capable routers run the unicast distance-vector protocol to construct to prune
broadcast delivery trees into multicast trees as a follows.6e rst packet sent by a source
is ooded to every link not having a unicast route back to the source. Routers not having
members for the specic unicast group then report back their preference not to receive
anymore packets for the group. However, to reach potential newmulticast groupmembers,
6Protocol Independent Multicast Dense-Mode (PIM-DM) [2] is similar to DVMRP with minor
modications; it uses the default unicast routing protocol instead of implementing its own.
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DVMRP has to occasionally re-ood packets to not interested routers.is together with
the per source state in the routers and reliance to distance-vector routing protocol results
in poor scalability.
In shared-tree multicast routing protocols – Core-Based Trees [11] and Protocol
Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) [46] – the focus is on scalability. In
them, sources share a tree rooted at a Rendezvous Point (RP) router (of an administrative
domain). Routers explicitly join to a tree by sending a join request towards the unicast
path of an RP, instead ooding multicast packets and receiving routers only then asking
for being pruned from the tree.is ts nicely to applications where the multicast trees
are sparse, i.e., the majority of routers are not a member of a group. However, shared-tree
protocols are not as robust as source-based ones due to their dependence on the RPs,
and the discovery of an RP is challenging to implement at interdomain level. Multicast
Service Discovery Protocol (MSDP) [47] and its BGP related extensions [13] enable the
discovery of RPs and group membership management at interdomain level.
e ongoing diculties to deploy interdomain IPmulticast ledHolbrook andCheriton
to question the need to support multiple sources in IP multicast [69], and in the resulting
Protocol Independent Multicast - SSM (a part of [46]), multicast groups are source-
specic. While this limits the supported use cases, the model is much simpler. As the
group is identied based on the source address, maintaining the multicast tree using
Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF) [34] becomes easy. In a similar manner, the ISPs know
exactly which source is responsible (and to be charged, perhaps) for the trac, and
moreover, the access control to the tree is a problem of the source. In a more recent
proposal, Free-Riding Multicast [114], inspired by hardware and bandwidth development
trends, the approach is taken even further: routers are relieved from the management of
multicast delivery trees and the responsibility to form the tree becomes a problem of a
router near the source. In the proposal, the source router receives the group membership
information over BGP and then computes the multicast tree, and sends a multicasted
packet to its every link leading to group members. In every packet the source router then
encodes the delivery tree. Routers receiving these packets then merely decode the tree
information and using it determine to which links they should be sending the packet
next. In essence, the complexity of maintaining interdomain multicast trees is traded to
increased bandwidth (since encoding is probabilistic, routers may forward packets to
links not having members), and increased consumption of CPU resources (since routers
need to decode every multicast packet they receive).
Finally, we note that the overlay networks have been successfully used to implement
and deploy multicast networks. While avoiding many of the above deployment challenges,
these proposals do face the same challenge the shared-tree multicast protocols face; in the
end, discovering amulticast tree (i.e., locating the closest RP) translates into a requirement
of implementing the anycast primitive. For an example of a such design, see e.g., [97].
Mobility
Internet architecture was not designed for mobile hosts: since IP addresses embed
topological information, they change by necessity when a host roams from an IP network
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to another. As a result, a mobile host can’t be reached at a single IP address and transport
layer connections break when migrating from a network to another. e research
community has produced numerous proposals to the problem, but in central role to
most of them is the concept of indirection: a mobile host is provided with an address that
remains unchanged and network infrastructure takes of delivering packets sent to that
point of contact further to the mobile host.
Teraoka et al. in [136] were among on the rst ones to propose implementing
indirection using a “shim layer” existing directly on top of IP.e shim layer operates on
virtual IP addresses which remain unchanged regardless of the host’s movement. Later
the shim layer found its way into Mobile IPv4 [96].is keeps mobile hosts reachable at
a single IP address by providing them with a home agent (which the mobile host keeps
informed its current location).e home agent then relays any packets received to the
mobile host’s home address to its current address. If both end-points support IP mobility
extensions, they can avoid routing trac via home agent in normal conditions (however,
if they lose connection with each other, they would use home agent to re-synchronize
themselves about each others’ locations). However, since IP addresses are so easy to
spoof, lacking strong notion of end-point identity, securing these route optimizations is
non-trivial (see e.g., the background of Mobile IPv6 security solutions [98]).
Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [94] is a proposal responding to these practical
engineering challenges. It introduces a at, cryptographic end-point identiers, which
exist (again) at the shim-layer just above IP: the cryptographic end-point identiers
establish strong notion of end-point identity and the required security solutions are easier
to design.e cryptographic identiers introduce a new set of problems, however: DNS
doesn’t help in resolving a at, host identier to an IP address of the host nor to an
address of its home agent. DHT-based overlays can provide the required functionality
and the Internet Indirection Infrastructure [131] demonstrates how elegantly the problem
of mobility can be solved together with placing at identiers on top of IP and capability
to route on at identiers.
Mobility can be implemented above the network layer. Since changing IP addresses
mostly aect the operations of TCP, extensions to implement support for mobility in TCP
have been proposed by many (e.g., [60, 71]). However, they introduce a new problem:
changing TCP implementations required changes on both hosts, unless peculiar measures
are used to determine whether a remote end-point supports the necessary TCP extensions
or not [153]. In [129], Snoeren pushes the solution even higher in the stack and argues the
most natural place for solving the mobility problem is at the session layer. Since neither
the host stack nor the network required modications, the approach is practical. However,
the simplicity comes with a performance cost: for many, solving the mobility problem
lower in the stack is mostly due to the need to support relatively fast hand-overs, and the
need to re-establish transport and session protocol sessions in a handover largely nullies
that goal. For the rest of the users, session based mobility provides a clean solution, since
for them, mobility problem isn’t about fast handovers but about intermittent connectivity
due to laptop power management and relatively infrequent migrations from a network to
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another. In the end, there are no large scale deployment of any IP-based mobility protocol
and most of the deployed solutions are based on extending the application layer protocols
to support mobility (as e.g., is done for SIP in [123]), or on updating DNS with the current
IP address and assuming the addresses changes are rare (which works for e.g., a host with
a dynamically assigned IP address).
Finally, we note that while we discuss host mobility above, mobility is more general
concept. For instance, increasingly popular host virtualization introduces application
mobility [154] and a special form of host mobility due to virtual machine migration [26].
2.4 Context
In this section, we discuss several issues that provide essential context for this thesis.
2.4.1 Architecture and Protocol Design Principles
e architecture of the Internet is based on a number of principles. In the following, we
briey recap the key principles essential for the research presented in this thesis.
Modularization is an essential soware development technique: it divides a large
system into more manageable subcomponents. In the TCP/IP protocol stack, protocol
layering was the chosen method of modularization. Each protocol layer provides
functionality built on top of the layer below, the lowest being the layer interfacing with
hardware.7 Layers both provide an interface for the layer above as well as for their peers
over the network. Specic protocols implement these layers, and to remain interoperable
with other hosts, they all need to follow the protocol specications.
e network layer, or IP layer as it’s oen called, has a special role in the TCP/IP
protocol stack: it provides the base for interoperation over various network technologies.
IP imposes few limitations on the protocol layers below or above. Hosts may implement
various transport and applications protocols and remain interoperable as long as both
peers implement the same protocols. Where as below the IP, networks may use various
local area network technologies as long as the protocols are translated at the network
interconnections. To emphasize the important role that such a layer plays in enabling
interoperability over a wide range of heterogenous systems, IP has been called a “spanning
layer” [30].
In their seminal paper [120], Saltzer, Reed, and Clark present a design principle
that has greatly aected the design of the Internet: the end-to-end argument. While
today it may seem obvious, in its time the principle was a radical departure from the
classic communications system design. In the classic design, the communication system
provided a feature-complete interface for attached hosts and applications – even the lowest
layers of the communication systems had mechanisms nowadays present mostly at higher
layers (e.g., mechanisms to improve reliability). According to the end-to-end principle,
implementing such mechanisms at low layers in the stack (i.e., in the “middle”) made
little sense, since the communication end-points had to implement the same functionality
to guarantee the level of service for applications.
7Over the time, other forms of modularization has been proposed as well (see, e.g., [19, 132]).
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e use of the Internet has evolved greatly since the original presentation of the
end-to-end argument. Indeed, Blumenthal et al. in [18] observe there’s a risk the original
design principles will be compromised by new requirements stemming from the modern
use of the Internet. As discussed in Chapter 1, it’s the combination of involvement of
new stakeholders, new applications, and growing popularity of the Internet that together
drive this development. However, since the conicts in the network ultimately stem from
conicts between various stakeholders in general, it has been argued accommodating and
designing for these tussles is a challenge the Internet will face and have to resolve [28].
e issue of fate-sharing is closely related to the end-to-end argument: while the end-
to-end argument denes the placement of the functionality, considerations of fate-sharing
oen indicate which parts of the system should share the state.e principle was nicely
captured by Clark: “it is acceptable to lose state information associated with an entity if,
at the same time, the entity itself is lost.” [29] In other words, hosts shouldn’t share state
with the network – since network failures can occur – whereas, sharing state with a peer
is acceptable. Aer all, if the host is lost, their connection has little meaning anymore.
e shared state can be further divided to so-state and hard-state; the rst can be re-
established (by the network) without interrupting a communication session of end-points,
while re-establishing the latter does require re-establishing the communication session.
e primary Internet transport protocol, TCP, provides a byte-oriented stream
abstraction for applications, and hence, little of application information is exposed to the
stack. In Application Level Framing (ALF) [31], applications expose more information by
operating on Application Data Units (ADU). Once the application message boundaries
are visible for the stack, their protocol implementations can optimize the performance
more easily. For example, if a part (e.g., a packet) of an ADU can’t be recovered due
to some reason, it’s likely that the rest of the ADU is useless for the application as well.
Moreover, once the messages become self-contained, their processing order becomes
less important for the protocol stack. ALF has had a strong impact on the design of
modern end-to-end protocols. For example, SCTP [130] implements its principles, and
in a similar manner, the message bundles of DTN [42] can be considered an instantiation
its principles.
Protocol stack implementation performance became a concern once the multimedia
applications began to emerge in the late 1980s. In Integrated Layer Processing (ILP) [31],
the goal was to integrate the processing of an ADU at all protocol layers into a single
computational loop. It would maximize the locality of data references [1], and therefore,
would optimize the performance of protocol stack implementations. However, in the
end, modest performance improvements didn’t justify the complexity and the fragility
of the required protocol implementations, even when implementations were machine
generated [20]. Moreover, the performance bottleneck was oen elsewhere, in the
application itself or in the network.
2.4.2 Cryptography
In public-key cryptography, or asymmetric cryptography as it’s also called, a key to encrypt
data is public while a key to decrypt data is private.is is very dierent from the classic
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symmetric cryptographywhere the keys to encrypt and decrypt data are the same: here, the
security of encrypted data depends on a single key – if the key is leaked, the encrypted data
becomes public.erefore, public-key cryptography is more suitable for communications
purposes; a public key can be widely distributed (for potential communication peers),
while the private key doesn’t need to be distributed to anyone but its owner. Public-key
cryptography also facilitates digital signatures. For signatures, instead of using a private
key to decrypt, it is used to sign data and the corresponding public key is used to verify the
resulting signature. RSA [118] was one of the rst public-key cryptosystems and remains
to be widely used, whereas elliptic curve public key cryptosystems [89] are more recent,
and require fewer computational resources [101].
To trust a public key belongs to an intended communication peer, public-key
cryptography requires additional mechanisms. Without these mechanisms, an attacker
could replace a public key with its own without being detected and the data would be
encrypted for the attacker, not for its indented receiver. Public-Key Infrastructures (PKI)
provide amechanism to establish trust in a public key: a trusted-third party, a Certication
Authority (CA), signs a digital certicate binding the communication peer’s identity and
public key. If a host has obtained the public key of the CA from a trusted source, a potential
communication peer can hand it a certicate (with both peer’s public key and identity)
issued by the CA and the host can verify the CA’s signature in the certicate. Hence, the
host can verify the public key belongs to a host it intended to contact. While PKIs are
widely deployed, their dependency to a single trust anchor (i.e., CA), is both a scalability
challenge and in mismatch with many trust models in practice. Simple PKI (SPKI) [39]
is a response to these challenges and can been seen as a generalization of the PKI: in
SPKI, any principal can issue a certicate to delegate authorizations from itself to another
principal, which may delegate them further.
While public-key cryptography can be used to encrypt and decrypt data, it’s more
ecient to use symmetric cryptography for actual transmission security and to use the
public-key cryptography only to execute a key exchange protocol, which generates a
symmetric key for the symmetric cryptography based protocol. End-to-end security
protocols, such as IPsec [75] (at IP layer), Transport Layer Security (TLS) [37] (on top of
TCP), and Secure Shell [152] (on top of TCP as well) are protocol suites implementing
the key exchange protocol(s) and symmetric cryptography based protocols for data
transmission.
Cryptographic hash functions (such as SHA-1 [99]) can establish a useful property of
self-certication, which has applications in verifying the authenticity of data, as well as,
more generally in establishing a secure communication channel.e cryptographic hash
functions produce, like any hash function, a xed size representation of variable sized data,
but also guarantee that a) nding amessage that produces a hash value identical to the one
produced for other message, and b) nding any two messages that produce identical hash
value, is computationally hard.ese properties alone are convenient in verifying the
authenticity of read-only data: it’s enough to provide an application with the data together
with its hash value. Moreover, since the hash is unique with high probability, applications
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can use it as an identier for the data (as is done e.g., for lesystem blocks in [84]). If
the application data is mutable, the cryptographic hash functions can be applied to a
public key of the data owner; then the veried public key can be used to verify the digital
signature produced by the owner or to establish a secure communication channel to the
owner.is ability to encode a secure representation of a public key into xed size string
is convenient for many applications. For example, in the Secure Filesystem (SFS) [88],
lenames embed a cryptographic hash of a public key. In a similar manner, the hash of a
public key can be embedded into the lower part of IPv6 address [7].
2.4.3 Routing
e core infrastructure of the Internet is composed of routers. It’s the task of the routers to
forward IP packets from senders to receivers through a series of routers. To route packets
through the Internet towards their receivers, routers need to populate their routing tables
with information how to reach dierent networks.8 Relying on manual conguration of
the routing tables is infeasible, since these tables are constantly changing, for a variety of
reasons: networks establish new interconnections, customers change their providers, new
networks join the Internet, and links and routers experience transient failures, etc.
ere routing tables are managed by Internet routing protocols. Using a routing
protocol, a router exchanges network reachability information with other routers, thereby
learning how to reach the dierent networks of the Internet.ere are three major groups
of deployed Internet routing protocols, which we now briey discuss.
Link-state routing protocols. In link-state routing protocols like OSPF [95], routers
share link status information and every router independently computes the best path
to every destination network based on the network link graph it has learned. However,
since each change in the status of an individual link propagates throughout the entire
network, the scalability of this approach is limited.9 e main domain of applicability
remains in the intra-domain routing, i.e., within a single network. (Although even then
their practical administration can be non-trivial [52].)
Distance-vector routing protocols. In distance-vector routing protocols (such as
RIP [87]), routers inform their adjacent routers about distances, in router hops, to
networks they know about. If a receiving router learns a new shorter route to any network,
it updates its routing tables and informs subsequently its connected routers about this
better route. While distance-vector routing protocols are simple, they suer from poor
convergence and scalability properties.
Path-vector routing protocols. Interdomain routing on the modern Internet is based
on BGP [116], which is a path-vector routing protocol. To improve scalability, BGP is
only run between Autonomous Systems (AS) – which are collections of networks under
the same administrative domain – and not between every router. In BGP, routers share
their network connectivity information, but instead of expressing the reachability to
8In modern routers, routing tables are not used to forward packets but to populate forwarding tables of
the network interface cards, which are responsible for high-speed packet forwarding.
9However, as shown in [83] if slightly increased stretch is acceptable, certain updates can be suppressed.
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each destination as a single numeric distance, they exchange the entire path.10 is is
the key to policy routing, which allows network administrators to choose routes based
on the entire path, not just on the shortest distance. For an introduction to the current
interdomain policy routing practices, see e.g., [22]. In this manner, ISPs can implement
trac engineering, i.e., they can optimize the use of their network resources by moving
trac from too loaded links to less loaded links. While its exactly this exibility that is
behind the success of BGP, its also exactly the source of BGP’s many challenges.
Interdomain routing policies transform the routing system into an arena of battles
between ISPs and can result in routing instabilities, which can lead to packet loss, increased
network latency and time to converge [80]. Indeed, only long aer the deployment of BGP
was its practical stability veried: Gao and Rexford proved that BGP is indeed guaranteed
to converge in the presence of realistic interdomain routing policies [61]. (Moreover,
around the same time Grin et al. formulated the exact problem BGP solves: unlike
distance-vector and link-state routing protocols, BGP isn’t a distributed algorithm for
solving the shortest-path problem but stable-paths problem [64].) Even aer intensive
research, BGP remains dicult to analyze: its distributed nature allows only indirect
means of discovering information [126]. In addition to this fundamental property of BGP,
it’s also worthwhile to mention that its proper conguration remain a signicant challenge
since to achieve high-level trac engineering goals typically only indirect means exist.
Finally, we note that while the Internet routing protocols are relatively stable, the
capability of Internet router infrastructure to accommodate new applications and better
serve their needs is very limited. Indeed, the protocol implementations are largely hard-
coded, and their evolution is relatively slow (mostly from crisis management by IETF).
An interesting future option could be declarative routing [85], where routing protocols are
dened in terms of a database query language, which could then lead to faster evolution.
2.4.4 Scalability of Routing
e scalability of interdomain routing has been a major concern on Internet, and indeed,
the few changes to the Internet core architecture have been motivated by scalability
concerns. As discussed earlier, CIDR [59, 115] successfully solved the pressing issues of IP
address exhaustion and non-linear BGP routing table growth by introducing a variable-
length network prex in IP addresses.is allowed networks to get an IP address block
meeting exactly their needs, which increased allocation eciency. In a similar manner,
ISPs could advertise an aggregate block of addresses instead of individual customer
address blocks. CIDR required both soware changes to BGP as well as hardware changes
to the routers’ packet forwarding plane. It introduced the requirement of longest prex
matching: with CIDR, a packet had to be forwarded to a next-hop indicated by a routing
table entry having longest match.11
e scalability of the Internet routing has recently become a concern again [57, 91].
10In BGP, the messages about network reachability updates embed a list of ASes to use to reach the
destination.
11To implement longest prexmatching in high-speed router interface cards, both special algorithms (see
e.g., [81, 139]) and components are required (e.g., TCAMs).
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However, unlike at the time of CIDR’s deployment, this time the reasons behind the
concern are more diverse:
• Multihoming. e increasing importance of IP has made site-multihoming
increasingly popular approach to improve resilience of the network connectivity.
Unfortunately, it requires use of so-called Provider Independent (PI) addresses,
which largely nullify the aggregation CIDR established: once customer’s address
block is not anymore a part of its provider’s own address block, the provider can’t
advertise the block as a part of its own address block.
• Trac engineering practices. For example, it is a common practice to split
network prexes and advertise them separately with diering AS paths in order to
obtain more ne-grained control over the trac entering the ISP network.
• Non-aggretable address allocations. Due to historical reasons, certain address
blocks are not aggretable.
• Business events. IP addressing is not a nice t with company mergers and
acquisitions, and therefore, companies end up having multiple address blocks.
e CIDR’s increasing ineectiveness has introduced a class of proposals attempting to re-
establish the aggregation by building tunnels over the core of the Internet (e.g., [43,141,155]).
To avoid changes to hosts, the edge routers (or routers near the edge) encapsulate the
packets and transmit the packets over the core using highly aggregated addresses. While
this is merely transforming a BGP problem into another, the new problem is expected to
be somewhat easier to solve: it is the problem of distributing relatively stable mappings
between end-site IP addresses and their aggregates.
e concern over the routing table growth has sparked theoretical interest on routing
algorithms as well. Namely, the research eld of compact routing studies the limits of
scalability of routing in graphs in general and it has been recently tried to adapt to the
problem of Internet routing [79]. While compact routing can provide even sub-linear
routing table (relative to size of the network), with modest path stretch (aer all, compact
routing is a departure from the shortest path routing), the required algorithms only
work well on rather static network topologies. Moreover, they don’t typically support at
addressing.
Finally, in addition to the routing table growth, the scalability of the BGP in terms of
convergence and stability remains a concern. As discussed above, these challenges stem
from the distributed nature of the BGP and the exibility it provides for ISPs. As a solution,
using a path-vector routing protocol (enabling policy routing) only in the very core of the
Internet, among Tier-1 operators12, and a link-state protocol (providing good converge
and stability properties) in the ISP hierarchies below them has been proposed [133].
12Unlike other ISPs, Tier-1 operators don’t have many route changes in their connectivity with each
other.
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2.4.5 Securing Routing
Since interdomain routing is so vital for the Internet, it’s security is a great concern. While
the distributed nature of BGP provides a reasonable foundation for its operational goals,
the distribution is also the root cause for the security challenges it faces:
First, local BGP conguration errors may have global signicance. Indeed, as the
incidents in the past have shown; a simple error may result in national or even global
Internet shutdown requring manual intervention from ISPs. For example, in two well-
knownmajor incidents [32,127], an ISP falsely announced prexes they didn’t own. (In the
1997 case an ISP announced C class subnet per every available IP prex with devastating
consequences for the routers of the Internet.)ese simple mistakes led to prexes that
were unreachable from major portions of the entire Internet. While major incidents
are relatively rare, minor miscongurations are common and continue to plague the
BGP [86].
Second, while defending against such non-intentional errors is challenging, it is even
harder to defend against intentional attempts to hijack (i.e., to receive trac destined to a
prex) or intercept (i.e., to become a relay for the trac destined to a prex) prexes.13
While ISPs can implement safety measures to lter out suspicious prex announcements,
in general it is impossible to verify a) a route announcement originated from the actual
prex owner or b) a router relaying the announcement actually has a path towards the
prex. Prex hijacking has long been known to be trivially easy, but it has been recently
shown that prex interception is also possible for a signicant number of prexes [10].
ere is a class of more local security problems that are easier to resolve and solutions
to them have been already deployed to certain extent. For instance, the security of BGP
connections can be protected by end-to-end security protocols. We don’t discuss these
issues here.
To address the fundamental security challenges of BGP, there are practical approaches
available. For instance, it is common practice to exercise careful versioning for router
congurations [113]. Moreover, there are tools that can analyze the BGP conguration
to certain extent before it’s deployed (e.g., [44]), as well as, tools for detecting suspicious
route advertisements, either with the help of centralized repositories (e.g., [63]) or by
analyzing the updates and their impact locally before applying them (e.g., [73]). However,
these practices and tools don’t address the fundamental source of the problem: there’s no
clear concept of prex ownership at the BGP level.
Secure BGP [76] was one of the rst complete proposals oering a remedy for the
BGP security vulnerabilities. It addresses the prex ownership problem by introducing a
PKI that is rooted at Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),
which among other responsibilities is the root authority of the Internet addresses. ICANN
then authorizes regional address space allocation authorities to allocate their address
spaces as they best see, by issuing certicates to them.e regional authorities further
authorize ISPs to assign addresses for their blocks by issuing certicates to ISPs (and so
13Prex hijacking has implications beyond connectivity blocking and trac interception, e.g., it facilitates
sending of untraceable spam [110].
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on). As a result, the digital signatures by address block owners in the route advertisements
can now be veried by any BGP router as long as it trusts to the root certicate of ICANN.
Secure Origin BGP (soBGP) [146] avoids the deployment of global ICANN rooted
PKI and instead assumes the PKI roots are more ad-hoc in nature: in soBGP, a small
number of trusted third parties, such as Tier-1 ISPs and commercial CAs, certify the
bindings between address blocks and their owners.e owners of these address blocks
then certify owners of the smaller address blocks.
Finally, we note that it has been argued the secure routing proposals have a wrong
focus [145]: instead of focusing on providing a single secure path, the network should
focus on guaranteeing availability between end-points by providing end-points with a
number of paths to select from.en if a host determines a path is not leading towards
the host or service it intended to connect or that the path has insucient quality, it could
switch to another. Once such mechanism is provided, the standard end-to-end security
measures can assist hosts in detecting when there’s a reason to change a path.
2.4.6 Communication Abstractions
A network without applications is rather meaningless, and hence, together as operating
systems added support for IP they added Application Programming Interfares (APIs) for
applications to access the communications services of the network stack. While in the
beginning dierent operating systems had their unique APIs for applications to interface
with the network stack, eventually the API of the 4.4BSDUnix, Sockets API [82], became a
de facto standard. To this date, the Sockets API remains to be themost popular application
interface to the TCP/IP stack; all modern Unix systems provide it and it’s emulated by
many other operating systems, e.g., by Microso Windows.
e Sockets API is a generic interprocess communications interface, with few
limitations on the network technologies it can support. Its main abstraction is a
socket, which is essentially a communication end-point.e Sockets API then provides
applications with primitives to operate on sockets; applications can open and close them,
connect them (e.g., to remote hosts), wait for inbound connections, and send and receive
data (bytes and datagrams). Applications must dene the properties of the sockets they
open, such as the socket type (whether it’s a stream socket, datagram socket, etc.), the
communication domain (whether socket is a TCP/IP socket or some other socket), and
give a name to the socket by binding it to a network address (or to another name relevant
for the chosen communication domain). Hence, while the Sockets API can accommodate
a wide range of interprocess communication mechanisms, the applications’ responsibility
to be in control of the communication details results in tight coupling between the network
stack and applications.
At the same time, applications expose little of their semantics for the network stack.
e stack merely sees operations revolving around byte streams or datagrams, so the stack
can’t provide applications with performance matching their needs. While ALF [31] argued
for the benets of exposing more application level semantics in form of Application Data
Units (ADU), only relatively recent transport protocols and their APIs (e.g., SCTP [130])
have adaptedmessage-orientation and several research projects taken initial steps towards
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exposing more application-level semantics. For example, in [111], Raman and McCanne
demonstrate how exposing the actual application data structure (by means of hierarchical
naming of ADUs instead of typical stream-oriented sequential naming) benets in
implementing reliable multicast. In [50], Ford demonstrates how replacing the distinction
between datagrams and streams with a single abstraction of hierarchical, structured
streams facilitates transport services that match, and even exceed, the performance of the
Sockets API based application protocol implementations embedded into the applications
today.
e Sockets API leaves application developers with a responsibility to implement
all the application (and session) protocols. However, since the needs of applications
are oen very alike, over the years various application frameworks have arisen.ese
middleware systems come in many forms (see, e.g., [92, 102, 135]); some provide only basic
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) services layered on top of sockets, while some provide
a developer with a range of high-level services useful in building distributed systems.
For example, in addition to RPC, enterprise-oriented middleware systems oen include
implementations for distributed transactions and database access protocols. However, the
most common provided service among RPC is publish/subscribe-like messaging service,
which has been proven to be extremely useful in integration of heterogeneous (enterprise)
systems. (Tibco [137] is a classic example of such amessaging-oriented middleware system.)
However, unlike with the dierent implementations of the TCP/IP stack, no single API for
these middleware systems has emerged – even though modern programming languages
do oen include standardized interfaces for various types ofmiddleware services (e.g., Java
has a generic messaging interface, [134]). In the research community, such common APIs
have been proposed, though (see, e.g., [106] for a common API for the publish/subscribe
systems).
In practice, middleware systems are mostly used in the server-side implementations
of enterprise applications, and not in the communications between them and their clients.
Recent proposals haven take steps towards simplifying Internet application development,
however. Data-Oriented Transfer (DOT) [108, 138] is a practical attempt to decouple data
transferring functionality from the applications. In DOT, applications are provided with a
data transfer interface that can take the burden of bulk data transfers away fromapplication
protocols leaving the application developers merely responsible for the implementation
of the “signaling” plane.e interface simplies application developers, but it also lets
transfer mechanisms to evolve and be deployed independently from the applications and
their application protocols. In Haggle [132], the communications interface revolves purely
around data and the related meta-data; and the burden of communications is entirely
shied from the applications to so-called “communications managers” below the API.
is decoupling of applications from the details of the communications is argued to be
especially attractive in (future) mobile ad-hoc networks, where the Sockets API would
render the communications part of applications complex due to very dynamic and diverse
communication conditions.
Finally, we note about the abstractions developed by the parallel computing com-
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munity. e various shared-memory approaches, as well as low-latency messaging
services, are common in computation clusters, but tuple-space systems are an example of
alternative, very powerful programming abstraction the community has produced. In
Linda spaces [62] (and in its later embodiments, e.g., [56,148]), associativememory storing
tuples facilitates distributed computation. Applications are provided with primitives
to operate on these tuples, concurrently. Unfortunately, while primitives are very
generic and powerful, their implementation results in tight synchronization between
the communication peers, and hence, tuple spaces as an abstraction are challenging to
provide beyond tightly coupled computation clusters.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, we reviewed the essential background of this thesis. We began with
the history and current state of the core of the Internet architecture: addressing and
naming. We then discussed the challenges the Internet faces today that motivate the
changes proposed herein: the trend towards data-orientation in the Internet usage,
extending the reach of the Internet to challenged networks, the need to control access in the
traditionally open Internet, as well as the diculties of supporting delivery models beyond
the traditional unicast model, such as anycast, multicast, and mobility. We concluded the
chapter by discussing several issues that are necessary context for the proposed changes:
the design principles of the Internet, essential cryptographic mechanisms, routing, and basic
communications abstractions.
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Chapter 3
Conclusions
In this thesis, we have described the foundations for a clean-slate network stack that
better accommodating the requirements of current Internet usage than the existing
Internet architecture.e resulting naming scheme and name resolution mechanisms
serves the current data-oriented usage of the Internet and properly takes the new “middle”
stakeholders into account.e proposed form of addressing at the network layer embeds a
rmnotion of accountability into the foundations of the Internet, and gives users a weapon
against denial of service attacks. In addition to naming and addressing, we proposed
initial steps towards decoupling applications from details of the communications stack,
in the hope of facilitating their independent evolution.
e design of this clean-slate network stack is far from complete. e proposals
presented here are starting points, not nished products. In all areas, but especially
regarding the communicationsAPIs, we feel that we havemerely touched the surface of the
problem domain. For instance, distilling the API proposal into an exact, implementable
interface description is a non-trivial design exercise, and until that has been done our
proposal is merely speculative.
In addition, a wide range of issues, beyond the focus of this thesis, remain unaddressed.
For instance, the current architectural approaches to interdomain routing, congestion
control, and network management are lacking in one or more important respects, and
new approaches, whether incremental or radical, must be found.
As said in the beginning of the thesis, the ultimate test of an architecture is how good
t it is with its current and unexpected usage. While we have solved a few of the current
issues the Internet faces today, and hence, partially “upgraded” its architecture to match
certain known problems, predicting the future usage of the Internet is impossible. Aer
all, the one thing that can be reliably predicted is that the Internet will continue to seed
new innovative applications that are impossible to foresee.
is uncertainty of the future Internet usage leaves us with a perplexing question:
what will be the exact location of the spanning layer in the future Internet?at is, what
will be the lowest layer providing interoperability? As demonstrated by us and others,
IP, naming, and data-oriented communication abstractions are all candidates; yet, they
provide varying levels of capabilities to integrate network technologies – the higher a
spanning layer is located in the communications stack, the less restrictions are imposed
on the technologies below, and the less freedom provided for the layers above.e future
course of the Internet’s evolution cannot be settled in the pages of this thesis, or by its
learned commentators. It is the eventual usage of the Internet that denes which of
these (or other) possible spanning layers will prevail.
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We unconditionally admit that this uncertainty about the future makes it impossible
to predict what role the proposals presented here will play in the future Internet. However,
we dare to claim that the individual components proposed herein – naming, addressing,
and communications abstractions – have the potential to provide important benets no
matter which course the future Internet takes.
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